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Utah at the Crossroads: The Role of the Judiciary in 
Initiative and Severability Law after Gallivan v. Walker 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“Two roads diverged in a wood, and I, 
I took the one less traveled by, 
And that has made all the difference.”1 
In deciding the highly controversial case of Gallivan v. Walker2 the 
Utah Supreme Court found itself in a situation analogous to the 
predicament Robert Frost describes in “The Road Not Taken.”3 The 
Gallivan plaintiffs were sponsors of an initiative that would place 
significant restrictions on the transportation of nuclear waste within the 
state of Utah.4 When their initiative ran afoul of Utah’s multi-county 
signature provision, the plaintiffs brought an emergency petition for an 
extraordinary writ before the court. The plaintiffs argued that the multi-
county signature requirement was unconstitutional and could be severed 
from the remaining portions of Utah’s initiative law.5 The plaintiffs’ 
petition left the court at a legal crossroads. If the court found for the 
plaintiffs, it would, without legislative input, drastically alter 
legislatively created initiative procedures that had remained practically 
unchanged since the original grant of the initiative power in 1900. On the 
other hand, if the court ruled against the plaintiffs, then the people’s 
access to the initiative power would be reduced or, in the event the court 
found the signature provision unconstitutional and nonseverable, 
temporarily eliminated. 
Just as the paths in Frost’s poem diverged at the crossroads and led 
to very different destinations, the members of the Utah Supreme Court 
split over Gallivan and followed separate lines of reasoning to reach the 
opposing outcomes mentioned above. Gallivan’s dissent argued that the 
signature requirement was constitutional and that Utah’s initiative law 
 
 1. ROBERT FROST, The Road Not Taken, in COLLECTED POEMS 45 (Jane Doe ed., Classic 
Books 1995), available at http://www.robertfrost.org/indexgood. 
 2. 54 P.3d 1069 (Utah 2002). 
 3. FROST, supra note 1, at 45. 
 4. Gallivan, 54 P.3d at 1076. 
 5. Id. 
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was nonseverable.6 In contrast, Gallivan’s majority held that the 
signature requirement was unconstitutional and that the requirement was 
severable from the remainder of Utah’s initiative law.7 
This note demonstrates how the Gallivan majority erred when it 
ignored conventional legal precedent governing initiative and 
severability law and instead employed unconventional legal analysis to 
find that Utah’s signature requirement was unconstitutional and 
severable. More specifically, this note examines how the majority 
misapplied or overlooked Utah legal precedent governing two areas of 
law: (1) the definition of a fundamental right, and (2) the rules of 
construction governing the severability of legislative provisions. In 
addition, this Note addresses the policy reasons supporting a return to 
more conventional legal principles when analyzing initiative law in the 
context of fundamental rights and severability law in the context of 
statutory construction. With this objective, Section II provides a brief 
history of initiative and severability laws applicable in Utah. Section III 
provides a summary of Gallivan v. Walker and illustrates how the 
majority and dissenting opinions disagree on every material issue in the 
case. Finally, section IV analyzes problems created by the majority’s 
characterization of fundamental rights and severability issues. It also 
demonstrates how proper adherence to current legal precedents would 
prevent the legal dilemmas otherwise inherent in the majority’s analysis. 
The case note ends with a brief summary of the relevant legal 
conclusions outlined in the preceding sections. 
II.  UTAH’S INITIATIVE AND SEVERABILITY LAWS PRIOR TO GALLIVAN V. 
WALKER 
A.  A Brief Overview of Initiative Law in Utah 
1.  How signature requirements regulate access to Utah’s initiative 
ballot 
Inspired by the populist movement at the end of the nineteenth 
century,8 Utah amended its Constitution in 1900 and thus became only 
the second state to allow its citizens to adopt legislation by initiative.9 
This constitutional amendment specifies: 
 
 6. Id. at 1103-19. 
 7. Id. at 1076-1103. 
 8. Id. 
 9. DAVID D. SCHMIDT, CITIZEN LAWMAKERS: THE BALLOT INITIATIVE REVOLUTION XX 
(Temple University Press 1989). 
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The legal voters of the State of Utah in the numbers, under the 
conditions, in the manner, and within the time provided by statute, 
may . . . initiate any desired legislation and cause it to be submitted to 
the people for adoption upon a majority vote of those voting on the 
legislation, as provided by statute.10 
Although the Constitutional provision was created in 1900, the Utah 
Legislature did not create statutes setting forth the “numbers . . . the 
conditions [and] the manner” in which initiatives qualified for the ballot 
until 1917.11 The Legislature’s original statutory provisions for 
initiatives, written in 1917, contained both a multi-country signature 
requirement and a statewide signature requirement.12 
The two original signature requirements created in 1917 did not 
change substantively until 1998. In 1998, the Legislature amended the 
initiative statute and changed the multi-county signature requirement 
from fifteen counties to twenty counties. Both the statewide and the 
amended multi-county signature requirements applied to all Utah 
initiative petitions from 1998 until the court’s recent decision in Gallivan 
v. Walker. The 1998 signature requirements read as follows: 
A person seeking to have an initiative submitted to a vote of the people 
for approval or rejection shall obtain 
(i) legal signatures equal to 10% of the cumulative total of all votes cast 
for all candidates for governor at the last regular general election at 
which a governor was elected; and 
(ii) from each of at least 20 counties, legal signatures equal to 10% of 
the total of all votes cast in that county for all candidates for governor 
at the last regular general election at which a governor was elected.13 
An individual who wants to put an initiative on the ballot must 
satisfy several other prerequisites in addition to fulfilling the signature 
requirements. Persons wishing to circulate a statewide initiative petition 
must start the process by filing an application and a copy of the proposed 
law with the Lieutenant Governor.14 The application must be endorsed by 
 
 10. UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 1(2)(a)(i)(A) (2002). 
 11. See Intervenors’ Response in Opposition to Petition for Extraordinary Writ at 4, Gallivan 
v. Walker 54 P.3d 1069 (Utah 2002) (No. 02-0545). 
 12. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-11-1, 3 (1993). The original multi-county signature 
requirement read in pertinent part: “Legal voters of this state in the number required herein . . . may 
initiate any desired legislation, and cause the same to be submitted . . . to a vote of the people for 
approval or rejection . . . provided that in order to make any such petition mandatory a majority [15 
of 29] of all counties of the state must each furnish signatures of legal voters not less in number than 
the percentages herein required.” § 20-11-1. 
 13. UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-7-201(2)(a)(i)-(ii) (2002). 
 14. Initiative and Referendum Institute, The Basic Steps to do an Initiative in Utah, 
INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM INSTITUTE, March 18, 2003, http://www.iandrinstitute.org/ Utah.htm 
(last visited on March 18, 2003). 
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five sponsors who are registered voters and who have voted in Utah’s 
general election in each of the past three years.15 Before allowing the 
initiative’s proponents to begin circulating the petition, the Lieutenant 
Governor must allow the Attorney General to review the initiative 
application.16 Even after sending the initiative application to the Attorney 
General for review, the Lieutenant Governor can still reject the 
application if the law it proposes (1) is patently unconstitutional, (2) is 
nonsensical, or (3) could not become a law if passed.17 Once the 
initiative’s sponsors have collected a sufficient number of signatures, and 
the signatures are verified as meeting Utah’s statutory signature 
requirements, the Lieutenant Governor will qualify the initiative for the 
ballot.18 
2.  Utah’s definition of a “fundamental right” in the context of initiative 
law 
The sharp divergence of Gallivan’s majority and dissenting opinions 
regarding the constitutionality of the multi-county signature requirement 
can be traced back to whether Utah’s right to the initiative can be defined 
as a fundamental right. Petitioners contended that the signature 
requirement was unconstitutional because it violated equal protection 
principles.19 Both parties in Gallivan acknowledged that the level of 
scrutiny applied in equal protection cases hinges upon whether the right 
at issue is a fundamental right.20 
“The ability to pursue a change in the law through the initiative 
process is solely a state created right.”21 There is no federal initiative 
right.22 “However, once a state creates an initiative process, the system 
must comport with the protections afforded under the U.S. 
Constitution.”23 Thus, there is no fundamental federal initiative right, but, 
depending upon the specific laws within the jurisdiction, a state-created 
initiative right might be considered fundamental. 
In the 1980 Utah Supreme Court case Utah Public Employees 
Association v. Utah,24 the court set forth guidelines as to what constituted 
 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Gallivan v. Walker, 54 P.3d 1069, 1084-85 (Utah 2002). 
 20. Id. at 1084-85, 1104. 
 21. Id. at 1101 (Thorne, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 22. See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 424 (1988); Save Palisade Fruitlands v. Todd 279 F.3d 
1204, 1211 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 23. Gallivan, 54 P.3d at 1101 (Thorne, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 24. 610 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1980). 
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a fundamental right within the State. The petitioners in this case 
attempted to assert that the right to hunt wild buffalo, sheep, and moose 
was a fundamental right.25 In denying the petitioners’ claim, the Utah 
Supreme Court noted that “the catalog of fundamental [rights] is 
relatively small to date and includes such things as the rights to vote, to 
procreate, and to travel interstate.”26 The court went on to identify what 
separates fundamental rights like voting and procreation from 
nonfundamental rights by indicating that “[o]nly those rights which form 
an implicit part of the life of a free citizen in a free society can be called 
fundamental.”27 
In 1957, the Utah Supreme Court indirectly addressed the question of 
whether the initiative power fits Utah’s definition of a fundamental right 
in Schriver v. Bench.28 The petitioners in Schriver argued that the 
initiative power enabled the general populace to set firefighter and police 
salaries by means of an initiative vote.29 The court found that the 
initiative power could not be used to set firefighter and police salaries 
because such action was administrative in nature and initiative laws only 
apply to legislative matters.30 
Besides limiting the scope of the initiative power to legislative 
issues, the Utah Supreme Court used Schriver to implicitly place 
additional restrictions on the initiative power. For example, although the 
court acknowledged that the people did have the ultimate control over 
government salaries, the court indicated that in this instance the initiative 
was not a proper means by which the people could exercise that 
control.31 Instead, the court held that the people could adequately express 
their will through their elected representatives.32 By holding that the 
initiative power could be restricted when other political options (i.e., the 
election of new representatives) imbued the people with the ability to 
effect the desired changes, the Utah Supreme Court implied that the 
initiative power does not form an implicit part of life in a free society.33 
 
 25. Id. at 1273. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. From the federal perspective the United States Supreme Court has referred to 
fundamental rights as being those rights “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Palko v. 
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
 28. 313 P.2d 475 (Utah 1957). 
 29. Id. at 476 
 30. Id. at 476, 480. 
 31. Id. at 479-80. 
 32. Id. at 479. 
 33. Id. 
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B.  An Overview of Severability 
The implications associated with the Gallivan court’s decision as to 
whether the multi-county signature requirement is severable from the rest 
of Utah’s initiative law extend beyond resolving the status of plaintiffs’ 
initiative action. If the signature provision had been held to be 
nonseverable, then the entire initiative law might be struck down and the 
plaintiffs would be left without a mechanism to place their initiative on 
the ballot.34 However, when the court found, contrary to the assertions of 
Utah’s Legislature, that the signature provision was severable, it may 
have infringed upon the powers and responsibilities that Utah’s 
Constitution grants to the Legislature. 
Severability issues may arise when a court decides that a legislative 
act is partially invalid. “The severability question asks whether a court’s 
holding that part of a statute is invalid causes the remainder of the statute 
to be invalid as well.”35 In such instances a court must determine whether 
to sever the defective provision (while upholding the rest of the provision 
as good law) or to invalidate the entire statute. While severability is a 
fundamental legal concept, courts have generally indicated that a statute 
is only severable when certain conditions are met.36 Under these certain 
conditions, an unconstitutional portion of a statute may only be severed if 
(1) the remaining provisions in the legislative act can actually function 
without the invalid provision, and (2) the legislature would have enacted 
the remaining provisions of the statute without the invalid provisions.37 
1.  If the valid portions of a statute do not constitute a complete and 
serviceable act after the unconstitutional provision is excised, then the 
provisions of the act are not severable 
“To be severable, the valid portion of an enactment must be 
independent of the invalid portion and must form a complete act within 
itself.”38 If the valid portion of the enactment cannot stand alone as a 
complete act, then even an express statement of the legislature’s intent to 
make the statute severable will not preserve the valid portion of the 
statute. For example, in Albuquerque v. Cauwels & Davis, Management 
Co., the New Mexico Supreme Court indicated that a city ordinance 
 
 34. Gallivan v. Walker, 54 P.3d 1069, 1098 (Utah 2002) (Thorne, J., dissenting) (citations 
omitted). 
 35. 2 SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 44A:16, at 874 (N. Singer ed., 6th ed. 
2001). 
 36. See id. § 44:1, at 548. 
 37. See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987). 
 38. SUTHERLAND supra note 35, § 44:1, at 566. 
OLDROYD - MACRO FINAL 4/30/2003  5:22 PM 
367] UTAH INITIATIVE LAW 373 
governing taxation of businesses was not severable because the valid 
portions of the ordinance were “inextricably intertwined with the invalid 
portions of the ordinance.”39 Utah has also held that statutes cannot be 
severed if the provisions of the statute are interrelated. In 1968 the Utah 
Supreme Court found that “even where a [severability] clause exist[s], 
where the provisions of the statute are interrelated, it is not within the 
scope of this court’s function to select the valid portions of the act and 
conjecture that they should stand independently of the portions which are 
invalid.”40 
2.  Severability is primarily a matter of legislative intent 
Valid portions of a statute that are not inextricably entwined with the 
invalid portions of the statute may be severable if the legislature intended 
such provisions to be severable.41 In fact, “Severability . . . where part of 
a statute is unconstitutional is primarily a matter of legislative intent.”42 
“The test fundamentally is whether the legislature would have passed the 
statute without the objectionable part.”43 In Stewart v. Utah Public 
Service Commission, the Utah Supreme Court explained how courts 
should determine legislative intent regarding the severability of a statute: 
Whether a part of a statute that is held unconstitutional is severable 
from the remainder of the statue depends on legislative intent. Where 
that intent is not expressly stated, a court will infer the probable 
legislative intent from the relationship of the unconstitutional provision 
to the remaining sections of the statute by determining whether the 
remaining sections, standing alone, will further the legislative 
purpose.44 
This test lists several different factors that can help determine 
legislative intent. Other factors, like the general presumption in favor of 
severability, are implied rather than expressly stated. Whether expressly 
or implicitly identified, the factors that are generally used to determine 
severability include (1) a presumption in favor of severability, (2) 
severability clauses, and (3) legislative history. 
a.  Legislation is generally presumed to be severable. The presumption 
that a legislature intended its legislation to be severable is derived from 
several general policies of statutory construction. These policies indicate 
that, (1) “statutes should be construed to sustain their constitutionality 
 
 39. 632 P.2d 729, 731 (N.M. 1981). 
 40. State v. Salt Lake City, 445 P.2d 691, 696 (Utah 1968). 
 41. SUTHERLAND supra note 35, § 44:3, at 552. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Union Trust Co. v. Simmons, 211 P.2d 190, 193 (Utah 1949). 
 44. Stewart v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 885 P.2d 759, 779 (Utah 1994). 
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when it is possible to do so,” (2) “[t]he legislature is presumed not to 
intend the passage of an invalid act,” and (3) “[n]o legislative action is to 
be declared unconstitutional except for clear and satisfactory reasons.”45 
The Utah Supreme Court adhered to these principles when it 
acknowledged the existence of a general presumption in favor of 
severability in Celebrity Club Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commission.46 
The plaintiffs in Celebrity Club argued that section 32-1-32.6 of the 
Utah Code,47 violated the Utah Constitution.48 To a certain extent, the 
Utah Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiffs by holding that the final 
sentence of section 32-1-32.6 did violate the Utah Constitution. The 
court however, in order to “effect the minimum necessary disruption of 
the statutory scheme,”49 only struck down the final sentence of 32-1-32.6 
and upheld the rest of the statute. In explaining its decision to sever the 
unconstitutional language in the statute the court stated that, “it is 
axiomatic that statutes, where possible, are to be construed so as to 
sustain their constitutionality. Accordingly, if a portion of the statute 
might be saved by severing the part that is unconstitutional, such should 
be done.”50 
b.  Only detailed and specific severability clauses are likely to have 
significant impact on a judicial determination of severability. It has become 
common practice in many states to add a severability clause51 to 
legislation in the hope that the severability clause will protect valid 
portions of the legislation from being found unconstitutional.52 However, 
in many jurisdictions, “[b]ecause of the very frequency with which it is 
used, the [severability] clause is regarded as little more than mere 
formality.”53 
The difficulties inherent in creating an effective severability clause 
are illustrated in the Utah Supreme Court case State v. Lopes. In Lopes, 
the court indicated that a severability clause could impact findings of 
severability by expressly stating the intent of the legislature: “To 
determine if a statute is severable from its unconstitutional subsection, 
 
 45. SUTHERLAND supra note 35, § 44:1, at 548-49. 
 46. 657 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1982). 
 47. UTAH CODE ANN. § 32-1-32.6 (1953). This statute gives the Utah Liquor Control 
Commission plenary authority to rescind an establishment’s liquor license without giving the 
establishment an opportunity to appeal the Commission’s decision in court. 
 48. Celebrity Club, 657 P.2d at 1294. 
 49. Id. at 1299. 
 50. Id. 
 51. For an example of the language in a typical severability clause see UTAH CODE ANN. § 
10-1-113 (2002) (“If any chapter, part, section, paragraph or subsection of this act, or the application 
thereof is held to be invalid, the remainder of this act shall not be affected thereby.”). 
 52. SUTHERLAND supra note 35, § 44:8, at 585. 
 53. Id. 
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we look to legislative intent. If the intent is not expressly stated, we then 
turn to the statute itself, and examine the remaining constitutional portion 
of the statute in relation to the stricken portion.”54 Severability clauses, 
particularly very specific clauses, would seem to provide the express 
statement of legislative intent regarding severability that is mentioned in 
Lopes. A general severability clause, however, is not necessarily an 
express statement of the legislature’s intent.55 
Sutherland Statutory Construction states that “it is reasonable to 
infer that because a general act cannot control subsequent legislative 
intent and therefore is questionable evidence of it, less weight may attach 
to such a general rule of [severability] than to [a severability] clause in a 
separate act.”56 Thus, courts will probably hold that a general severability 
clause is not an accurate indicator of whether the legislature intended a 
specific piece of legislation to be severable. In contrast, a specific 
severability clause embedded within an individual statute may provide 
the “expressly stated” legislative intent that courts look to first when 
examining questions of severability. 
c.  Legislative history can provide significant guidance as to legislative 
intent. According to some interpretations, legislative history can provide 
another “express statement” of legislative intent.57 Whether it is 
considered an express statement of legislative intent or an implied 
statement of legislative intent, legislative history is a factor that courts 
use to determine legislative intent. In Massachusetts Public Interest 
Research Group v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, for example, the 
Superior Judicial Court of Massachusetts found that a multi-county 
signature requirement was not severable from other provisions in the 
initiative statute.58 The court explained its finding of non-severability by 
alluding to an extensive body of legislative history associated with the 
restriction: 
The [multi-county] provision became one of the most hotly debated 
issues of that convention and consumed forty-five days of the 
convention’s time. The significance of the county-distribution rule to 
art. 48 as a whole is reflected in the primacy afforded that provision in 
the version finally adopted by the electorate.59 
 
 54. State v. Lopes, 980 P.2d 191, 196 (Utah 1999) (emphasis added). 
 55. See id. at 191. 
 56. SUTHERLAND supra note 35, § 44:8, at 585. 
 57. See Intervenors’ Response in Opposition to Petition for Extraordinary Writ at 26, 
Gallivan v. Walker 54 P.3d 1069 (Utah 2002) (No. 02-0545). 
 58. 375 N.E.2d 1175, 1179-80 (Mass. 1978). 
 59. Id. at 1180. 
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As demonstrated by the Superior Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 
legislative history can play a significant role in determining the 
legislature’s intentions regarding severability issues. 
III.  UTAH INITIATIVE LAW AND THE MULTI-COUNTY SIGNATURE 
REQUIREMENT: GALLIVAN V. WALKER 
A.  History of the Case 
On April 10, 2002, a number of Utah citizens filed an application 
with Lieutenant Governor Olene Walker to circulate a petition for a 
statewide initiative known as the Radioactive Waste Restrictions Act.60 
The Lieutenant Governor approved the initiative for circulation on April 
15, 2002.61 Although the initiative was approved for circulation, in order 
to qualify for placement on the 2002 election ballot the sponsors of the 
Radioactive Waste Restrictions Act needed to gather at least 76,180 
certified signatures in support of the initiative. The 76,180 signatures 
represented ten percent of the total number of voters statewide who voted 
in the last gubernatorial election. In addition to this statewide 
requirement, Utah’s multi-county signature requirement provided that the 
signatures obtained by the initiative sponsors must be distributed 
throughout the state. Specifically, this multi-county signature 
requirement provided that the sponsors must obtain from each of at least 
twenty counties, legal signatures equal to ten percent of the total of all 
votes cast in that county for all candidates for governor at the last 
gubernatorial election.62 
By June 1, 2002, the initiative sponsors had collected over 130,000 
signatures.63 Between June 1 and July 1 of 2002, opponents of the 
initiative contacted individuals who had signed the petition and urged 
them to remove their signatures from the petition.64 When the signatures 
were delivered to the Lieutenant Governor on July 1, 2002, only 95,974 
signatures remained.65 Although the 95,974 signatures collected by 
proponents of the initiative surpassed Utah’s statewide requirement of 
76,180 signatures, the collected signatures were concentrated in specific 
counties and only met multi-county signature requirement in fourteen of 
Utah’s twenty-nine counties, six counties short of the twenty counties 
 
 60. Gallivan v. Walker, 54 P.3d 1069, 1076 (Utah 2002). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 1076-77. 
 63. See Intervenors’ Response in Opposition to Petition for Extraordinary Writ, Gallivan v. 
Walker 54 P.3d 1069 (Utah 2002) (No. 02-0545). 
 64. Gallivan, 54 P.3d at 1077. 
 65. Id. 
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mandated under Utah law.66 The Lieutenant Governor declared the 
initiative petition legally insufficient to be placed on the ballot because 
the initiative sponsors failed to meet the multi-county signature 
requirement.67 
On July 16, 2002, the sponsors of the Radioactive Waste Restrictions 
Act petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for an extraordinary writ finding 
that the initiative petition was legally sufficient and compelling the 
Lieutenant Governor to place the initiative on the ballot.68 The court 
found that it had original jurisdiction to consider the petition for an 
extraordinary writ.69 
B.  The Disparate Findings of the Majority and the Dissent 
Gallivan v. Walker dealt primarily with three questions: (1) Is the 
initiative right granted by the Utah Constitution a fundamental right, (2) 
does the multi-county signature requirement violate equal protection 
principles, and (3) is the multi-county signature requirement severable 
from the statewide 10% signature requirement.70 The Gallivan majority 
answered “yes” to all three questions. Although Gallivan’s dissent 
addressed the same three questions asked by the majority, the dissent 
diverged sharply from majority and answered “no” to each question. 
IV.  ANALYSIS: THE GALLIVAN MAJORITY ESCHEWED TRADITIONAL 
BASES OF INITIATIVE JURISPRUDENCE AND SEVERABILITY LAW AND 
INCORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE INITIATIVE RIGHT WAS FUNDAMENTAL 
AND THAT THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED THE MULTI-COUNTY 
SIGNATURE REQUIREMENT TO BE SEVERABLE 
A.  The Gallivan Majority Erred When it Held that the Initiative Right 
Guaranteed by the Utah Constitution Was a Fundamental Right 
The Gallivan majority held that Utah’s “reserved right and power of 
initiative is a fundamental right under article VI, section 1 of the Utah 
Constitution.”71 However, the majority erred in designating the initiative 
power as a fundamental right. The initiative power does not fit Utah’s 
definition of a fundamental right for several reasons. First, historically, 
the initiative right has not been considered a right that “form[s] an 
 
 66. See id.; UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-7-201(2)(a)(ii) (2002). 
 67. Gallivan, 54 P.3d at 1077. 
 68. Id.; see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-7-207(4) (2002). 
 69. Gallivan, 54 P.3d at 1079. 
 70. See id. 
 71. Id. at 1082. 
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implicit part of the life of a free citizen in a free society.”72 Second, the 
limitations imposed on the initiative right serve to refute the claim that 
the initiative right is a fundamental right; and third, the initiative right is 
not inextricably connected with the admittedly fundamental right to vote 
in a general election. 
1.  Most Americans have no right to the initiative 
The Gallivan majority erred by finding that the initiative right is a 
“fundamental right implicit in a free society” when neither the federal 
government nor the majority of states recognize any fundamental 
initiative right at all. Utah’s Supreme Court has indicated that, “only 
those rights which form an implicit part of the life of a free citizen in a 
free society can be called fundamental.”73 Although the Utah Public 
Employees Association court did not unequivocally identify what 
distinguishes a fundamental right from other rights, it did note that “the 
catalog of fundamental interests is relatively small to date, and includes 
such things as the rights to vote, to procreate, and to travel interstate.”74 
A right to place an initiative on the ballot does not fall within the 
“narrow catalog” of fundamental rights because, in the United States, 
initiatives are not considered an implicit part of life of a free citizen in a 
free society.”75 In fact, most citizens in the United States have no 
initiative rights at all. There is no federal initiative right,76 and twenty-
seven states refuse to recognize any state-created right of initiative.77 
Since most of America’s “free society” does not recognize any right to 
the initiative power, much less a fundamental right, the right to the 
initiative should not be considered a fundamental right implicit in 
American society. 
2.  The Utah Constitution imposes legislative restrictions on the initiative 
right 
The right of initiative guaranteed by the Utah Constitution is not a 
fundamental right because the section of the constitution that creates the 
initiative power also imposes significant legislative restrictions on that 
power. Since the initiative power does not qualify, under Utah’s 
 
 72. Utah Pub. Employees Ass’n v. Utah, 610 P.2d 1272, 1273 (Utah 1980). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 424 (1988); Save Palisade Fruitlands v. Todd, 279 
F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 77. Intervenors’ Supplemental Response in Opposition to Petition for Extraordinary Writ at 
31, Gallivan v. Walker 54 P.3d 1069 (Utah 2002) (No. 02-0545). 
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definition, as a fundamental right, the argument might instead be made 
that the right of initiative is a fundamental right because it is explicitly 
granted by the Utah Constitution. However, such an argument fails to 
consider the limitations inherent in the constitutional provision that 
grants the initiative right. Article VI, section one of the Utah Constitution 
states: 
The legal voters of the State of Utah, in the numbers, under the 
conditions, in the manner, and within the time provided by statute, 
may . . . initiate any desired legislation and cause it to be submitted to 
the people for adoption upon a majority vote of those voting on the 
legislation, as provided by statute.78 
While this constitutional provision does grant Utah citizens a right of 
initiative, the language of the provision indicates that this initiative right 
is limited.79 Indeed, according to the constitutional language, the 
initiative right may only be exercised “under the conditions, in the 
manner, and within the time” established by the Utah Legislature.80 
Because Utah’s government created the initiative right and the 
government retains the right to significantly limit the scope of the 
initiative power, the initiative right should not be characterized as 
fundamental.81 
Fundamental rights are not subject to limitations like those imposed 
on Utah’s initiative power. For example, while the initiative can only be 
exercised “under the conditions, in the manner, and within the time” 
established by the legislature82, the fundamental right to interstate travel 
is virtually unqualified.83 
In Eunique v. Powell,84 the disparity between fundamental rights that 
require strict scrutiny and mere constitutional rights that do not require 
strict scrutiny is readily apparent. Eunique asserted that she had a 
fundamental right to international travel, similar to the fundamental right 
to interstate travel, and claimed that this right could only be curtailed by 
restrictions that survive strict scrutiny protections.85 The court agreed 
 
 78. UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 1(2)(a)(i)(A) (2002) (emphasis added). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Kelly v. Macon-Bibb County Bd. of Elections, 608 F. Supp. 1036, 1039 n.1 (M.D. Ga. 
1985) (“Where a state provides for an expression of direct democracy, such as by initiative or 
referendum, it does so as a matter of legislative grace.”). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981). See discussion of Utah Public Employees Ass’n 
supra Part IV.A.1. 
 84. 281 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 85. Id. at 943. 
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that there is a constitutional right to international travel.86 However, the 
court found that the right to international travel “can be regulated within 
the bounds of due process. In that respect, [the right to international 
travel] differs from the constitutional right of interstate travel which is 
virtually unqualified.”87 Because the right to international travel was 
subject to restrictions that did not apply to the fundamental right of 
interstate travel, the court declined to subject restrictions on international 
travel to a strict scrutiny analysis.88 
Just as the Eunique court held that the various restrictions placed on 
the right to international travel prevented that right from being a 
fundamental right, the Gallivan majority should have held that the 
legislative restrictions placed on the initiative right prevented the 
initiative power from being a fundamental right. Instead, the Gallivan 
majority ignored the constitutional restrictions placed on the initiative 
right and claimed that precedent indicated the use of the initiative power 
was a fundamental right.89 
In its opinion, the majority cited a variety of cases to support the 
concept that the initiative power is a fundamental right.90 However, as 
the dissent indicates, “a close reading of these cases shows that they do 
not, in fact, support the majority’s conclusion that the ability to change 
the law via the initiative is fundamental.”91 
For example, in Gallivan the majority claims Shriver v. Bench 
establishes the principle that “the reserved right and power of the 
initiative is a fundamental right under . . . the Utah Constitution.”92 
However, a closer analysis of Schriver belies the assertion that the 
initiative power is a fundamental right. In fact, the holding in Schriver 
actually limits the scope of the initiative power because the Schriver 
court found that there was no right to use the initiative to address 
administrative issues.93 
The Gallivan majority’s assumption that Schriver provides a 
fundamental initiative right is probably derived from Schriver’s assertion 
that the “fundamental power” to deal with administrative issues like 
salaries resides in the legislative power and in the people.94 On its face, 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Gallivan v. Walker, 54 P.3d 1069, 1080 (Utah 2002). 
 90. Id. at 1081-82. 
 91. Id. at 1105 n.7. 
 92. Id. at 1080. 
 93. Schriver v. Bench, 313 P.2d 475 (Utah 1957). See discussion of Schriver supra Part 
II.A.2. 
 94. Schriver, 313 P.2d at 480. 
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this statement from Schriver might seem to indicate that the initiative 
right is fundamental. Nevertheless, close scrutiny of the statement itself 
indicates the statement merely recognizes that both the legislative power 
and the people have, under the proper circumstances, the ability to make 
determinations concerning salaries.95 Indeed, in Schriver, the court 
specifically noted that its decision not to use the initiative to address 
salary issues did not remove or withhold from the people their 
fundamental right to control salaries.96 Because the elected council in 
charge of such salaries would be forced to set salaries in accordance with 
the will of the people or be held accountable during the next election, the 
court held that the initiative power was not needed to safeguard the 
people’s fundamental power to control government salaries.97 Therefore, 
Schriver should not be viewed as a case that establishes a fundamental 
right to the initiative. To the contrary, the Schriver court repeatedly 
recognizes limitations that diminish the initiative power rather than 
secure the initiative right a place among the “narrow catalog of 
fundamental rights.”98 
3.  The relationship between the initiative right and the fundamental 
right to vote 
The Gallivan majority also erred by using the obsolete legal 
precedent established in Moore v. Ogilvie,99 rather than the more recent 
holding in Burdick v. Takushi,100 to erroneously hold that the people’s 
right to exercise the initiative power was fundamental. The holdings in 
the United States Supreme Court cases Moore v. Ogilvie and Burdick v. 
Takushi diverge sharply on the issue of whether all election procedures 
must be subjected to strict scrutiny. By ignoring Burdick and relying 
principally on the obsolete standard set in Moore, the Gallivan majority 
departed from current election law and followed a case which was 
described by the Gallivan dissent as “an evolutionary dead end.”101 
In Moore, the United States Supreme Court held that a statute 
requiring nominating petitions for candidates to include 200 signatures 
from fifty of 102 counties was invalid because “[t]he use of nominating 
petitions by independents to obtain a place on the [. . .] ballot is an 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Utah Pub. Employees Ass’n v. Utah, 610 P.2d 1272, 1273 (Utah 1980). 
 99. 394 U.S. 814 (1969). 
 100. 504 U.S. 428 (1992). 
 101. Gallivan, 54 P.3d at 1107 n.8. 
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integral part of [the] elective system.”102 The Moore Court further 
explained that, all procedures used by a State as an integral part of the 
election process must pass muster against the charges of discrimination 
or of abridgment of the right to vote.103 
Since the Moore decision in 1969, the United States Supreme Court 
has determined that not all procedures used to regulate the voting process 
necessarily implicate the fundamental right to vote to a degree that would 
require the application of strict scrutiny principles. This shift in 
perspective is clearly illustrated in the Court’s 1992 holding in Burdick v. 
Takushi. In Burdick, the Court acknowledged that “[c]ommon sense, as 
well as constitutional law, compels the conclusion that government must 
play an active role in structuring elections.”104 In recognizance of this 
principle, the Burdick Court indicated: 
[T]o subject every voting regulation to strict scrutiny and to require that 
the regulation be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state 
interest, as petitioner suggests, would tie the hands of States seeking to 
assure that elections are operated equitably and efficiently. 
Accordingly, the mere fact that a State’s system “creates barriers . . . 
tending to limit the field of candidates from which voters might 
choose . . . does not itself compel close scrutiny.”105 
Burdick’s analysis indicates that the right to petition in order to place an 
initiative on the ballot should not be considered a fundamental right 
because the initiative petition right can be subject to reasonable voting 
regulations without significantly implicating the fundamental voting 
right and triggering strict scrutiny. In other words, as stated by the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, “[In voting rights cases] the 
thicket of strict scrutiny cases . . . separates into distinguishable groups, 
and it appears that [a right to petition to put an initiative on the ballot] 
does not fall within any one of them.”106 
Although both Moore and Burdick are occasionally cited as 
providing the standard of scrutiny applied to election regulations, most 
courts believe Burdick supplies the correct standard of review.107 In fact, 
the Gallivan dissent noted that since deciding Moore in 1969, the United 
 
 102. Moore, 394 U.S. at 818. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433. 
 105. Id. (citations omitted). 
 106. Mass. Pub. Int. Research Group v. Sec’y of the Commonwealth, 375 N.E.2d 1175, 1182 
(Mass. 1978). 
 107. See Rockefeller v. Powers, 74 F.3d 1367, 1378 (2d Cir. 1996) “[E]ven though ‘[e]lection 
laws will invariably impose some burden on individual voters,’ not all restrictions on access to the 
ballot merit strict scrutiny.” Id. at 1377 n.16; Mass. Pub. Int. Research Group, 375 N.E.2d at 1181-
82. 
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States Supreme Court has only cited Moore once (in 1979) as controlling 
authority in any election or voting case.108 The Gallivan dissent also 
noted that “petitioners concede that the approach articulated in Burdick 
may be the more applicable guide” in determining whether election 
regulations are subject to strict scrutiny.109 Given that Burdick supplies 
the more appropriate standard, the Gallivan majority erred by relying 
primarily on Moore, rather than Burdick, to support its claim that any law 
that affects the initiative process is a per se infringement on the right to 
vote. 
B.  The Major Difference Between the Majority and Dissent in Gallivan 
is Essentially a Disagreement About Whether the Initiative Power is a 
Fundamental Right 
The dissent and majority in Gallivan employ different equal 
protection analyses and reach opposite conclusions as to whether the 
multi-county signature requirement is constitutional. However, the 
motivation for these divergent analyses can be traced directly to whether 
the initiative right is a fundamental right that merits strict scrutiny 
protection. The true crux of the equal protection issue, then, is whether or 
not the initiative power is a fundamental right. Since that issue has 
already been addressed, this note will leave further discussion of 
Gallivan’s equal protection issues for another day. 
C.  In Determining that the Initiative Signature Requirements Were 
Severable, the Gallivan Majority Ignored Several Factors Customarily 
Used to Determine Legislative Intent With Regard to Severability 
The second major point of contention between the majority and 
dissent in Gallivan was whether the multi-county signature requirement 
was severable from Utah’s initiative provision. When dealing with 
questions of severability the question regarding “[w]hether the part of a 
statute that is held unconstitutional is severable from the remainder of the 
statute depends on legislative intent.”110 In determining that Utah’s multi-
county signature requirement was severable from the statewide signature 
requirement the Gallivan majority did not give significant weight to the 
factors traditionally used in severability determinations. The majority 
began its analysis correctly by alluding to the traditional severability test 
established in Lopes: 
 
 108. Gallivan v. Walker, 54 P.3d 1069, 1107 (Utah 2002). 
 109. Id. at 1108 (citations omitted). See also Petitioner’s Supplemental Brief at 18 n.20, 
Gallivan v. Walker 54 P.3d 1069 (Utah 2002) (No. 02-0545). 
 110. Stewart v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 885 P.2d 759, 779 (Utah 1994). 
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In determining if an unconstitutional subsection is severable from its 
umbrella statute, “we look to legislative intent.” When the legislative 
intent is not expressly stated, “we turn to the statute itself, and examine 
the remaining constitutional portion of the statue in relation to the 
stricken portion.” Upon reviewing the statute as a whole and its operation 
absent the offending subsection, “[i]f the remainder of the statute is 
operable and still furthers the intended legislative purpose the statute will 
be allowed to stand.”111 
Although the Gallivan majority cited this established test as the 
framework for its rationale, the majority then diverged from established 
precedent by not according significant weight to traditional severability 
factors like legislative history and express declarations of legislative 
intent. 
1.  Statutes are presumed to be severable 
The majority opinion recognized that statutes are presumed to be 
severable. Utah case law indicates “that statutes, where possible, are to 
be construed so as to sustain their constitutionality. Accordingly, if a 
portion of the statute might be saved by severing the part that is 
unconstitutional, such should be done.”112 The majority in Gallivan 
recognized this principle and correctly began its severability analysis 
with a presumption that the multi-county signature requirement was 
severable from the remainder of the initiative statute.113 
2.  Severability clauses provide express statements of legislative intent 
The majority opinion in Gallivan acknowledged that a severability 
clause would provide an express statement of legislative intent. In 
analyzing Gallivan’s severability issue, the majority noted that “[t]he 
legislature did not include an express indication of its legislative intent 
regarding the severability of potentially unconstitutional portions of the 
statute.”114 Although the legislature did not include a severability clause 
anywhere in the election code, much less in any of the individual 
statutory provisions of the initiative enabling act and its amendments,115 
the absence of a severability clause in the text of the initiative statute 
itself does not necessarily mean that the legislature never expressly 
 
 111. Gallivan, 54 P.3d at 1098 (quoting State v. Lopes, 980 P.2d 191 (Utah 2002)). 
 112. Celebrity Club Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm’n, 657 P.2d 1293, 1299 (Utah 1982). 
 113. Gallivan, 54 P.3d at 1098. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See Petitioner’s Supplemental Brief at 25, Gallivan v. Walker 54 P.3d 1069 (Utah 2002) 
(No. 02-0545). 
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indicated its intentions regarding the severability of Utah’s multi-county 
signature requirements. 
3.  The role of legislative history in determining legislative intent 
The Gallivan majority overlooked express statements in Utah’s 
legislative history that revealed the legislative purpose behind Utah’s 
signature requirements. Looking to the legislative history of a statute in 
an effort to discern legislative intent on severability issues is an 
acceptable method of determining legislative intent. In 1968 the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts relied extensively on legislative history 
in determining that a multi-county signature requirement for initiatives 
was a very significant part of the statue and therefore was not severable 
from the rest of the initiative statute.116 
Just as the Massachusetts statute’s legislative history provided 
insight into the severability of Massachusetts’ multi-county signature 
requirement, Utah’s legislative history also supplies evidence that the 
Utah Legislature placed a great deal of significance on the multi-county 
signature requirement. In 1994, the Utah Legislature voted to increase 
the multi-county signature requirement from fifteen counties to twenty 
counties.117 During the debates surrounding the amended signature 
requirement Representative Garn, a sponsor of the bill, explained the 
purpose that motivated his proposal to raise the multi-county signature 
requirement: 
The first [issue related to this bill] is that this bill will assure the 
citizens initiatives that go to the ballot are truly statewide issues. . . . If 
we’re going to have initiatives on the ballot let’s make sure that they 
are statewide issues. And increasing the counties from 15 to 20 does 
just that. . . . Instead of having 15 counties with 10% of signatures 
we’re increasing that to 20, so by doing that we make sure the 
initiatives that go on the ballot are truly statewide initiatives.118 
The legislative history shows Representative Garn’s sentiments 
regarding the multi-county initiative were shared by many individuals 
present during the legislative debates. For instance, Representative Bush 
argued for the stricter multi-county requirement when he explained, 
“[b]y making this so that more counties are involved we are actually 
improving the democratic process . . . and giving more people a voice in 
 
 116. Mass. Pub. Interest Research Group v. Sec’y of the Commonwealth, 375 N.E.2d 1175, 
1179-80 (Mass. 1978). 
 117. See Intervenors’ Supplemental Response in Opposition to Petition for Extraordinary Writ 
at 31, Gallivan v. Walker 54 P.3d 1069 (Utah 2002) (No. 02-0545). 
 118. Id. at 32 (quoting Tr. of Floor Debate of the Utah House of Representatives, Feb. 17 & 
18, 1998). 
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their government so that they can be involved in the initiative 
process.”119 
These excerpts of legislative history indicate that Utah’s legislators 
felt strongly enough about the importance of the multi-county signature 
requirement’s role in the initiative process that they amended the statute 
in order to increase the effect of the multi-county signature requirement. 
Since the legislature amended the initiative statute specifically to 
increase the effect of the multi-county signature requirement, it can 
reasonably be assumed that the legislature valued the role of this 
particular signature requirement and would not have created an initiative 
scheme that did not ensure that initiatives were “truly statewide issues.” 
The history of Utah’s initiative statutory framework also indicates 
that the multi-county signature requirement is an integral part of Utah’s 
initiative process.120 The multi-county signature requirement has been 
part of the initiative statutory framework since the initiative legislation 
was first enacted in 1917.121 Until the Utah Supreme Court struck down 
the provision in Gallivan, the multi-county signature requirement had 
never been removed from the statute. In fact, over eighty-three years the 
only action the legislature has taken in regard to the signature 
requirements of the initiative statute was the 1984 amendment designed 
to raise the requirements associated with the multi-county signature 
requirement.122 
D.  The Gallivan Majority Erred in Holding that the Utah Legislature 
Intended the Initiative Statute to be Severable Because Any Other 
Legislative Intention Would Be Unconstitutional Under the Utah 
Constitution 
The Utah Supreme Court departed from precedent when it held the 
legislature must have intended that the initiative statute to be severable 
since any contrary intention of the legislature would amount to an 
admission “that it [had] chosen to shirk its constitutional duty to establish 
a framework for the exercise of the people’s constitutionally guaranteed 
initiative right.”123 Rather than examine traditional indicators of 
legislative intent like legislative history and statutory construction, the 
court reasoned that “the legislature would have enacted the initiative 
enabling statute without the multi-county signature requirement because 
 
 119. Id. 
 120. Intervenors’ Supplemental Response at 32, Gallivan v. Walker 54 P.3d 1069 (Utah 2002) 
(No. 02-0545). 
 121. See id. 
 122. See id. 
 123. Gallivan v. Walker, 54 P.3d 1069, 1099 (Utah 2002). 
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it is compelled to do so by subsection 2 of article VI, section 1 [of the 
Utah Constitution] in order to enable the citizens to exercise their 
reserved initiative power.”124 In other words, the court is saying that the 
legislature has no power to create a nonseverable initiative statute 
because, in the event that the initiative statute was completely stricken 
from the Utah Code, the legislature would be in breach of its 
constitutional duty to provide the public with statutory access to their 
initiative rights. 
Events in Utah’s legal history appear to contradict the court’s 
assertion that the Utah Legislature would breach its constitutional duties 
if the initiative enabling statutes were found to be nonseverable and 
Utah’s citizens were thus temporarily bereft of means to put an initiative 
on the ballot. The constitutional provision authorizing the Utah 
Legislature to create a statutory scheme that enabled the people’s right to 
exercise the initiative power was created in 1900. Nevertheless, the Utah 
Legislature did not actually create an initiative enabling statutory scheme 
until 1917.125 If the Legislature’s seventeen year delay in creating the 
initial initiative enabling statute was not considered to be an 
impermissible breach of its constitutional duties, then the brief absence 
of initiative enabling legislation that would occur while the legislature 
crafted acceptable replacement initiative enabling legislation should not 
constitute a violation of the Legislature’s constitutional duties. 
The fact that the multi-county signature requirement and the state-
wide signature requirement created in Utah’s initial initiative enabling 
legislation remained essentially unchanged until Gallivan provides 
additional evidence that the legislature recognized the importance of both 
provisions and would not, under any circumstances, have intended these 
provisions to be severable.126 The Utah Legislature’s Office of 
Legislative Research and General Counsel explains: 
Neither [initiative signature requirement] standing alone has ever been 
considered to be sufficient because the omission of either [requirement] 
would dramatically alter the dynamics of qualifying a ballot initiative, 
that, if passed, would affect the entire state. . . . Each [initiative 
signature requirement] ensures a level of support for placing the 
initiative on the ballot, that without the other, would be inadequate for a 
statewide initiative with potential impacts on the whole state.127 
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 125. See discussion supra Part II.A.1. 
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Because the Utah Legislature has insisted on retaining both initiative 
signature requirements for the past eighty-five years, any suggestion that 
the Legislature would now be satisfied with an initiative enabling statute 
containing only one of the two signature requirements would defy reason 
and common sense.128 
Finally, the rationale underlying the Gallivan majority’s holding that 
the multi-county signature requirement is severable raises significant 
public policy concerns. The Utah Constitution gives the legislature the 
authority to create and regulate the initiative power. Nevertheless, under 
the Gallivan majority’s holding, the actual intention of the legislature 
regarding the severability of the multi-county signature requirement 
becomes irrelevant. In effect, the majority’s ruling in Gallivan has 
stripped the legislature of its constitutionally granted power to create a 
statutory initiative framework that incorporates the “numbers, . . . the 
conditions, . . .the manner, and . . . the time” specified by the 
legislature.129 Instead, the ultimate authority to create initiative law 
seems to have been appropriated from Utah’s Legislature by the Utah 
Judiciary. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Just as Robert Frost’s two paths diverged from the crossroads in the 
woods, the majority and dissenting opinions in Gallivan v. Walker 
diverge sharply from one another. The opinions differ significantly on 
whether the initiative right is fundamental and whether Utah’s multi-
county signature requirement is severable from the rest of the initiative 
statute. Throughout the decision, the majority opinion consistently 
departs from the traditional criteria generally used to determine questions 
regarding issues such as fundamental rights and severability and instead 
bases its holdings on obsolete or untried legal principles. The majority’s 
unconventional legal approach yields the wrong results in this instance. 
The initiative power should not fall within Utah’s relatively small catalog 
of fundamental rights because it does not form an implicit part of a free 
society, its operation is heavily restricted by legislative limitations, and it 
is not inseparably connected to the fundamental right to vote. Similarly, 
the majority should not have held that Utah’s signature requirement was 
severable from the rest of the initiative statute because such a ruling runs 
contrary to legislative intent and impermissibly infringes upon the Utah 
Legislature’s constitutionally granted powers. Fortunately, unlike Robert 
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Frost, who doubted he would ever return to the particular divergence of 
ways in the woods mentioned in his poem,130 the Utah Supreme Court 
will probably have future opportunities to return to this particular legal 
crossroads and revisit the questions of whether the initiative power is a 
fundamental right and whether the legislature has the power to create a 
nonseverable initiative signature requirement. When that time comes, the 
court should follow the lead of Gallivan’s dissenting opinion and use 
conventional legal precedents to hold that the use of the initiative power 
is not a fundamental right and that initiative laws are nonseverable. 
Jaysen Oldroyd 
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